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1. Introduction 
Multinational banks operate in foreign markets primarily under two organizational structures, a subsidiary and/or a 
branch. When deciding on the structural form of foreign operations, banks must consider a number of factors, 
including regulatory and taxation arrangements in the host countries (Fiechter, Otker-Robe, Ilyna, Hsu, Santos, and 
Surti, 2011) as well as factors related to the business model of the group (Hoggarth, Hooley, and Korniyenko, 
2013).1 Dell’Arrica and Marquez (2010) also consider various host country risks as important determinants in this 
decision making process. Their theoretical model suggests that a subsidiary structure benefits the banking group by 
protecting it from economic risks due to limited parent-affiliate liability (such risks may result from changes in the 
macroeconomic conditions, which in turn may affect the creditworthiness of borrowers and thus lead to higher 
default rates). A branch structure on the other hand is more beneficial in countries where expropriation risk is 
higher (examples of expropriation risks include, forcing banks to hold government debt or lending to favoured 
entities). 2   
In this paper we examine if the choice of organizational structure plays a role in the cross-border transmission of 
regulatory changes. We ask if multinational banks’ branches reduce their lending in foreign markets (i.e., the host 
country) more than subsidiaries in response to changes in the regulatory environment in their domestic markets 
(i.e., the home country). We further investigate whether this effect can be explained by a varying degree of control 
which parent banks hold over their affiliates operating under different organizational forms. To answer these 
questions, we exploit a novel dataset on 87 changes in the intensity of macroprudential regulation in 15 countries 
over the period 1997 to 2014. Our analysis focuses on the effect of tightening capital requirements, lending 
standards and reserve requirements on foreign banks’ lending to bank and non-bank borrowers in the UK.   
Violations of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks, such as the existence of deposit insurance, predict that 
banks choose inefficiently high levels of risk and lending which can be reduced by capital regulation (Kim and 
Santomero, 1998; Thakor, 1996). The empirical literature documents reductions in banks’ domestic and cross-
border lending propelled by increases in capital requirements (Peek and Rosengren, 1997 and 2000; Aiyar, 
Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko, and Wieladek, 2014; Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek, 2014a). Our contribution to 
this literature is that we explore to what extent changes in lending provided by foreign banks in host countries in 
response to regulatory changes in their home countries depend on whether the lending is done via a branch or a 
subsidiary.  
Why would the change in lending following a tightening of macroprudential regulation in their home countries 
differ depending on the organizational form of foreign banks? We argue that the legal distinction between branches 
                                                          
1
 Branches of foreign banks are subject to home country regulation, whereas subsidiaries are mainly regulated by the host country authorities. 
Therefore, where the regulation in a host country is unfavourable compared to home country regulation, multinational banks may find it 
more beneficial to operate under a branch structure. In terms of business model considerations, banks focusing mainly on wholesale 
operations may prefer to operate in the host country under a branch structure, whilst a subsidiary structure may benefit those banking groups 
which aim to serve non-bank customers and establish banking relationships in the host market. This reflects the fact that the branch structure 
allows for cheaper and more flexible transfer of funds between the parent and its foreign entity. 
2
 Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia and Martinez Peria (2007) provide empirical evidence supporting these findings. 
4 
and subsidiaries plays a key role. Under the branch structure foreign affiliates constitute an inseparable part of the 
parent organization. On the contrary, subsidiaries are considered as stand-alone institutions, with their own board of 
directors which needs to verify and approve business decisions, making it more difficult for the parent to control a 
subsidiary relative to a branch (Hoggarth, Hooley, and Korniyenko, 2013; Fiechter, Otker-Robe, Ilyna, Hsu, 
Santos, and Surti, 2011). Therefore, the organizational form of a foreign affiliate determines the degree of control 
which the parent organization holds over its foreign affiliate. Given that branches form an integral part of the parent 
bank, one could expect that in the case of a capital requirement tightening, the parent bank might find it easier and 
swifter to reduce lending provided by its foreign branches (relative to its subsidiaries) in order to meet a given 
capital ratio. This is the main focus of our paper. 
However, it could be assumed that since subsidiaries, unlike branches of foreign banks, are primarily subject to the 
regulation and supervisions of their host country, they should not be affected by a tightening of macroprudential 
regulation by their home country’s regulators. In such instances, the differential effects we are likely to find in this 
paper would be a purely mechanical one. The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey carried out by the World 
Bank and presented in Appendix A, shows that most countries which tighten capital requirements in our sample 
calculate the adequate level of capital using consolidated balance sheet information, which includes assets and 
capital of all of the groups’ foreign affiliates, including subsidiaries.3 Therefore, in response to a tightening of 
capital requirements, a banking group may decide to reduce lending by their branches, subsidiaries, or both to 
comply with the new macroprudential regulation.4  
Providing compelling evidence that the magnitude of cross-border regulatory spillovers varies with the 
organizational structure of foreign banks affiliates requires that we address several challenges. Firstly, decisions 
regarding lending retrenchment depend to a large extent on the decisions made at the parent-bank level. These 
decisions can reflect the strength of parents’ lending relationships both at home and abroad (Peek and Rosengren, 
1997, 2000) or the “level” of the home bias (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012). Geographical distance between banks’ 
home and host countries might also affect banking groups’ strategies with respect to cross-border lending (Aiyar, 
Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko, and Wieladek, 2014; De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). Secondly, changes in the 
intensity of macroprudential regulation can disproportionately affect banking groups due to their balance sheet 
characteristics. For instance, banks or banking groups with low capital buffers prior to a tightening of capital 
regulations might respond differently to those holding a higher capital buffer (Popov and Udell, 2012; Gambacorta 
and Mistrulli, 2004). Similarly, banks holding lower excess reserves are likely to reduce their lending to a greater 
extent to absorb an increase in required reserves relative to banks holding higher excess reserves (Mora, 2014). 
                                                          
3
 Appendix A presents a survey conducted by the World Bank which confirms that in most countries multinational banks calculate their 
capital ratios on a consolidated basis. In our sample the exceptions are China, South Africa and Switzerland. However, the results presented 
in Table 10 suggest that excluding Chinese, South African and Swiss banks from our sample does not affect our inferences. 
4
 It could also be argued that branches of foreign banks will reduce their lending more than subsidiaries as a result of capital shifting. A 
branch structure allows for cheaper and more flexible transfer of funds between the parent and its foreign entity. Given this, it could be 
argued that parent banks will move capital from their foreign branches in response to tighter capital requirements. However, technically 
branches don’t hold their own capital as they are not a separate legal entity. And since calculation of required capital is performed at the 
consolidated level, this strategy does not help parent banks to increase their capital ratios and therefore it is unlikely to be implemented by 
parent banks. 
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Kashyap and Stein (2000) show the effect of monetary policy on banks’ lending is significantly influenced by 
banks’ balance sheet liquidity. Thirdly, country-time-varying factors might also influence banking groups’ lending 
strategies in foreign markets. For example, increasing (decreasing) demand for parent banks’ products in the home 
market might provide an impulse to lend less (more) in foreign markets. 
In light of these issues, accurately establishing the degree to which organizational form affects the cross-border 
transmission of changes in the intensity of regulation requires that one controls for all factors which might affect 
parent banks’ lending decisions. But this is made difficult by the fact that many of these aspects, such as the 
strength of home bias, are difficult to observe and quantify. We overcome this problem by using an identification 
strategy that focuses on UK lending provided by branches and subsidiaries which belong to the same banking 
group. In other words, we limit our sample to foreign affiliates of multinational banks which operate at least one 
branch and one subsidiary in the UK. This allows us to exploit heterogeneities in the response to macroprudential 
regulation implemented in the home county using difference-in-difference estimations, while including banking 
group-time fixed effects.  
The UK is an ideal country to examine whether spillovers depend on organizational form because there were 321 
branches and 176 subsidiaries of multinational banks operating in the country between 1997 and 2014. In addition, 
38 banking groups simultaneously operate under both organizational structures. Multinational banks opt to operate 
in host countries under both organizational structures to exploit benefits specific to both organizational forms. In 
the UK, branches and subsidiaries of multinational banks may co-exist within the same institution due to legal 
requirements. For example, banks headquartered in countries outside the European Economic Area (EEA) often 
establish subsidiaries in the EEA to allow them to provide investment banking and lending services throughout the 
EEA without having to be separately authorised in each individual state. Banks may also decide to operate branches 
and subsidiaries in host countries simultaneously as a result of a merger. Becoming authorised as a branch or 
subsidiary is a lengthy and expensive process and so parent banks may wish to maintain existing legal structures, 
even if not currently optimal for their business. Additionally, London is a major financial centre, due to historical 
reasons, agglomeration effects, its time zone, language and legal system. This makes it a convenient centre to serve 
a wide range of types of clients and to provide different products including lending and investment banking 
services. 
Together, branches and subsidiaries account for a high share of lending in the UK. As illustrated in Figure 1, during 
the period 1997-2014 both branches and subsidiaries provided approximately 50% of loans to UK borrowers. 
Figure 1 also shows differences in the business models of both bank structures. Branches provide significantly 
more lending to other financial institutions operating in the UK, whilst subsidiaries mainly focus on lending 
provided to non-bank borrowers. Importantly however, both branches and subsidiaries are active in both markets. 
Our results suggest that a tightening capital requirements leads to an 8.2 percentage point decrease in interbank 
lending provided by foreign banks in the UK irrespective of their organizational form. We also show that such 
regulatory tightening disproportionately affects different organizational types of foreign banks. We find that an 
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increase in capital requirements at home causes foreign branches to reduce their lending growth to other banks 
operating in the UK by 5.7 percentage point more than foreign subsidiaries. We also document that tighter lending 
standards in domestic markets lead to a significant increase in foreign banks’ lending to non-bank borrowers (5.9 
percentage points). However, we do not find differential effects for a tightening of this type of macroprudential 
regulation. We also find that a tightening of capital requirements does not affect foreign banks’ lending to non-bank 
borrowers in the UK and that tightening of lending standards does not affect foreign banks’ lending to other banks 
operating in the UK. Finally, we do not find statistical significance for the results investigating changes in non-
bank and interbank lending following a tightening of reserve requirements. 
In an additional set of tests we document that the differential effect of a change in macroprudential regulation is 
only contemporaneous. We find that in the first, second, and third quarter following a tightening of regulation both 
branches and subsidiaries do not exhibit statistically significant differences in their lending behaviour. We 
strengthen our identification by estimating a number of falsification tests, regressions removing subsidiaries subject 
to individual capital requirements increases, tests excluding individual countries, control variables and providing 
results of regressions with alternative ways of clustering standard errors. 
Figure 1 
Foreign banks’ lending in the UK 
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Notes. Figure 1 presents evolution in the market share of total lending, lending to the UK non-bank private sector and interbank lending provided by branches and subsidiaries 
of foreign banks in the UK. 
7 
We perform a set of tests which help us identify the transmission mechanism behind our baseline results. 
Specifically, we focus on the degree of control which a parent bank is likely to grant its subsidiary. We follow the 
literature on delegation of decision making authority within firms, which suggests that parent banks will grant more 
credit decision making rights to subsidiaries if foreign affiliates provide significantly more non-bank lending 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Williamson, 1967), if parent banks are operating more affiliates in the UK (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1995; Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008) and finally if the distance separating the banking group 
headquarter and foreign affiliates is higher (Dessein, 2002; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2009). In addition to tests 
based on delegation of authority, we conduct a test exploiting information about the composition of subsidiaries’ 
boards of directors. Particularly, we look at the share of independent directors. In the UK, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority advises banks (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) to include an equal number of 
independent and executive directors on their boards. The former group of directors should provide independent 
oversight of the executives and their decisions (PRA, 2016). The Bank for International Settlements also recognises 
the importance of independent directors on boards of internationally operating banks. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) independent directors are supposed to allow for impartial evaluation of any group 
level decisions affecting operations of a subsidiary (BIS, 2010). Therefore, a higher share of independent directors 
should allow for greater autonomy of subsidiaries.     
Tests aiming at documenting proposed transmission mechanisms rest on the assumption that by delegating 
authority to its subsidiaries, parent banks surrender a certain level of control over these institutions’ operations. In 
those groups where a parent institution’s control over its subsidiaries is lower, foreign branches should respond 
more strongly to tighter macroprudential regulation. As a result, we should observe stronger differential effects for 
those banking groups. 
To perform these tests, we split banking groups into subsamples according to the share of non-bank lending, the 
number of affiliates, the distance between the headquarter of the banking group and foreign affiliates and the share 
of independent directors on subsidiaries’ boards of directors. We re-run our baseline regressions using these 
subsamples and - in line with the above theoretical predictions - we find that differences in the magnitude of the 
effect between subsamples in response to tighter capital requirements are stronger for groups where subsidiaries are 
likely to be more independent.  
These results yield support for the notion that the differential effect is at least in part driven by the degree of control 
parent banks hold over their affiliates. However, we acknowledge that other factors may potentially drive 
differential responses. These are likely to be related to the factors driving the choice of organizational form. 
Branches engage significantly more in interbank lending relative to subsidiaries, which could explain why we 
observe a stronger effect of capital requirements on this type of lending provided by branches. Alternatively, 
additional regulation affecting only subsidiaries and not branches, such as bank specific capital requirements 
imposed on UK subsidiaries of multinational banks by the Prudential Regulatory Authority may play a role. To that 
extent we test if these alternative explanations affect our results in robustness tests section of the paper. After 
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controlling for the level of interbank lending and removing institutions affected by bank-specific regulation, the 
differential effect of capital requirements on interbank lending still exists.  
Our work is motivated by, and contributes to, three strands of literature. The first are studies that document how 
multinational banks transmit financial shocks across country borders. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) find that banks 
from advanced economies restricted their credit supply in developing markets during the recent financial crisis. 
Schnabl (2012) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show that international banks’ liquidity shocks triggered by 
the 1998 Russian default crisis were transmitted via interbank lending to Peru and the US, respectively. Aiyar 
(2012) documents how foreign banks contributed to the lending contraction in the UK during the crisis by 
withdrawing funding from UK-resident affiliates. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that crisis periods increase 
home bias among multinational banks, reflected in shifts from foreign to domestic lending.  
A second strand of literature examines heterogeneities in the spillovers of bank balance sheet shocks. De Haas and 
Van Horen (2013) use the collapse of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock affecting the liquidity of 
internationally operating banks and find that foreign-owned banks significantly contract their lending in host 
markets. However, the key finding for this paper is the substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which different 
banks retrenched from the same country. Banks reduced credit supply mainly in countries geographically distant 
from their home country, where foreign banks were less experienced, where they operated under a branch structure 
and where they were disintegrated from the network of domestic co-lenders. Popov and Udell (2012) study whether 
contractions in lending provided by foreign banks may be sensitive to parent banks’ balance sheet conditions. They 
find that firms in emerging market countries experienced more difficulty obtaining credit from foreign banks whose 
parent banks suffered from negative shocks to their financial conditions. Firms in their sample were particularly 
constrained in localities served by banks with lower Tier 1 capital ratios. In addition to these studies Hoggarth, 
Hooley and Korniyenko (2013) show that lending provided by foreign branches in the UK was more volatile during 
the recent financial crisis compared to lending provided by foreign banks’ subsidiaries.5 
Finally, there is the literature on cross-border spillovers of regulatory changes via multinational banks’ operations. 
Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) evaluate the effect of the Japanese stock market collapse which coincided with 
the introduction of the Basel Accord in Japan in the early 1990s. They find that multinational Japanese banks 
whose capital ratios fell below the required level due to rapid declines of the stock market reduced their 
commercial and industrial, and real estate lending in the US, to comply with the new and tighter capital regulation. 
Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014) examine the effect of bank specific capital 
requirements on banks’ cross-border lending. They find that an increase in UK (home) capital requirements by 100 
basis points is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross-border credit by 5.5 percentage points. Using 
the same dataset on bank specific capital requirements, Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a) also find that an 
increase in capital requirements leads banks to cut lending in their domestic market, which is partly offset as 
                                                          
5
 Goulding and Nolle (2012) also show that foreign branches lending was much more volatile compared to lending provided by subsidiaries 
in the US, whereas Albetrazzi and Bottero (2014) find that foreign owned branches operating in Italy shrunk their lending in response to the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers much more than subsidiaries of multinational banks. 
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foreign banks expand their lending to this market. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014b) show that part of this 
offset in lending in response to an increase in capital requirements on the UK subsidiary is because a foreign 
banking group shifts loans from its UK-regulated subsidiary to its affiliated branch in the UK, likely as a form of 
regulatory arbitrage. Cross-border spillovers of financial regulation have also been found to affect banks’ lending 
standards. Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013) find that banks respond to tighter lending standards in the home 
country by taking more risk in foreign markets, reflected in more lending to ex-ante risky firms. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains our data and the conceptual framework. 
In Section 3 we discuss our identification strategy. We present our results in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 
5.   
2. Hypotheses and Data 
2.1 Capital requirements hypothesis 
Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014) test hypotheses surrounding the relationship between 
the intensity of capital requirements and banks’ cross-border lending. Banks which are required to increase their 
capital ratios can do so either by increasing their capital (capital issue, retained earnings), reducing their capital 
buffer or by reducing their risk-weighted assets. Since raising capital is expensive, and the empirical evidence 
suggests that banks prefer to keep a constant capital buffer, banks may prefer to reduce risk weighted assets. 
Multinational banks, which calculate their capital ratio based on consolidated accounts, including assets of their 
cross-border branches and subsidiaries, have a choice of either reducing lending in the home market or in foreign 
markets. Since banks are likely to prioritize their operations in their home markets, they are likely to prefer to 
contract lending provided by their foreign affiliates in their host markets.6 
Our study extends this hypothesis by studying whether multinational banks’ response to macroprudential regulation 
varies with the organizational form of their foreign affiliates. In other words, we want to find out if branches 
belonging to multinational banks restrict their lending to a greater extent than multinational banks’ subsidiaries. 
The main factor which makes us believe that such heterogeneity exists is the degree of control which parent banks 
hold over their foreign affiliates. A foreign entity operating under the branch structure constitutes an integral part of 
the parent bank. Its assets and liabilities constitute a fraction of the parent organization. Subsidiaries, on the other 
hand, under most circumstances are treated as separate institutions. They have their own board of directors who 
make decisions regarding the functioning of the subsidiary.7 Given this difference, we hypothesise the cross-border 
effect of capital requirements to be more pronounced for branches than for subsidiaries.8 
                                                          
6
 Giannetti and Laeven (2010) and Presbitero, Udell and Zazzaro (2014) provide empirical evidence on the existence of this home bias effect. 
7
 Even if the board of directors is appointed by the parent bank, decisions such as whether to reduce lending have to be approved by the 
subsidiaries’ board, which makes this process more time consuming than in the case of branches. 
8
 Multinational banks calculate their capital ratios based on consolidated accounts, which include assets of their cross-border branches and 
subsidiaries. Therefore, although subsidiaries are subject to host country regulation, they will also be subject to macroprudential regulation in 
their home markets. 
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2.2 Lending standards hypothesis 
To construct the hypotheses related to lending standards regulation, we follow the reasoning in Ongena, Popov and 
Udell (2013), who consider a number of mechanisms which can explain potential effects of home country lending 
standards on banks’ cross-border activities. In response to tighter lending standards, banks may adopt a more 
conservative approach to lending at home, which they then pass on to their foreign affiliates. Foreign banks’ 
branches and subsidiaries may also adopt less risky lending strategies for reputational reasons; the perception of 
bad risk management at an affiliate may have a negative impact on the reputation of the parent bank. Conversely, 
multinational banks subject to tighter lending standards might try to employ riskier lending strategies in foreign 
markets to compensate for their inability to extract higher returns from riskier borrowers at home.  
Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013) find support for the latter hypothesis; multinational banks subject to tighter 
regulation at home engage in riskier lending in foreign markets. This finding does not necessarily suggest that 
foreign banks increase the quantity of lending in the host countries following a tightening of regulation at home, 
since banks adopting a riskier lending approach could substitute lending to riskier borrowers for less risky 
borrowers. However, it is likely that by being able to lend to a wider pool of borrowers foreign banks’ lending in 
foreign markets will increase. 
As in the case of capital requirements, we could expect lending standards to have a stronger effect on foreign 
banks’ branches. However, in contrast to capital regulation, lending standards regulation applies to specific 
domestic products and is not applied to the balance sheet of the consolidated group. For example, countries often 
impose loan-to-value limits on all domestic mortgages (sometimes even within a specific area of the country). In 
addition, lending standards, unlike capital requirements, incentivise the parent bank to increase its lending in 
foreign markets. In other words, a tightening of capital requirements may increase constraints (if the Modigliani-
Miller theorem is violated, as discussed) whereas a tightening of lending standard regulations may actually loosen 
constraints on lending in foreign markets. Given that a parent banks’ balance sheet is unaffected in terms of 
compliance with tighter lending standards by risk taking of their foreign affiliates, it is possible that the parent bank 
will allow both branches and subsidiaries to provide lending to a wider pool of borrowers and increase lending. 
Also, convincing subsidiaries’ boards of directors to increase lending may be potentially easier than convincing it 
to reduce lending. Therefore, we would expect weaker differential effects in the case of a loosening of constraints. 
It is consequently possible that both types of foreign affiliates will respond to tightening of lending standards in a 
very similar manner. 
2.3 Reserve requirements hypothesis 
Finally, our paper evaluates the effect of reserve requirements on multinational banks’ cross-border lending. 
According to the “bank lending view” of monetary transmission, increasing reserves should result in credit supply 
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contractions (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).9 An increase in the reserve requirements acts as an implicit tax because the 
interest rates central banks pay on reserves held by banks are often below market rates. As a result of a tightening 
of reserve requirements it is likely that we would observe an increase in the loan-deposit rate spread, and 
consequently a fall in aggregate lending. Additionally, higher reserves mean banks have fewer funds available to 
lend, which can directly affect banks’ lending provision.10  Mora (2014) provides empirical evidence for the effect 
of reserve requirements on banks’ lending.11  
Considering that the liabilities of foreign branches are on the balance sheet of the parent bank, it is likely that 
branches of foreign banks operating in the UK will also increase their loan-deposit rate spreads in response to 
higher reserve requirements in their home countries. Higher cost of credit for UK borrowers should therefore result 
in a reduction of lending provided by branches, relative to subsidiaries of foreign banks. Alternatively, parent banks 
might attempt to absorb the effect of higher reserve requirements by relying on internal capital markets (Mora, 
2014).12 Providing funds to parent banks might have an adverse effect on the ability of foreign affiliates to sustain 
lending in the host country at the same level. Since capital flows between the parent bank and its affiliated branches 
are subject to lower constraints compared to subsidiaries, we would expect foreign branches to be more active in 
smoothing reserve requirements’ shocks to their parent institutions, and we therefore expect them to cut down 
lending to UK borrowers more relative to subsidiaries. 
However, in normal times, parent banks are likely to be able to access wholesale markets to substitute the lost 
liquidity, which may make detecting absolute and differential effects of reserve requirements tightening on foreign 
affiliate lending unlikely.   
2.4 Data description  
We use data from a number of sources to test these hypotheses. Lim et al. (2011), Borio and Shim (2007) and 
Kuttner and Shim (2013) are the main sources of information on macroprudential policy actions. Data from these 
sources are supplemented with hand-collected information from searches of regulators' websites and financial 
stability reports, and from communication with relevant authorities. This allows us to build a dataset containing 
information on 191 changes to macroprudential policies over the period 1997 to 2014. Although the early time 
period mainly covers actions taken in emerging economies, advanced economies have been more active in taking 
macroprudential actions since the global financial crisis. The dataset covers a wide range of macroprudential 
actions. We cover any action which is 'macroprudential'-like, rather than focusing on actions which have been 
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 In a more recent paper, Kashyap and Stein (2012) develop a theoretical model which shows that the central bank can control credit supply 
by increasing or decreasing the quantity of reserves in conjunction with adjusting interest rate on reserves. 
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 Reserve requirements are often employed by the regulators in emerging markets as a macroprudential tool. Reinhart and Reinhart (1999), 
Montoro and Moreno (2011), Terrier et al. (2011) suggest that regulators prefer to vary reserves requirements to tap credit supply rather than 
increase the interest rates as the later might attract capital inflows and lead to depreciation of the domestic currency. 
11
 Mora (2014) exploits an increase in reserve requirements in Lebanon which disproportionally affected deposits denominated in different 
currencies. Deposits denominated in foreign currency were subject to higher reserve requirements, relative to domestic currency deposits. 
Results show that this increase in required reserves had more adverse effects on lending provided by banks relying on funds denominated in 
foreign currency. 
12
 This reasoning is in line with the results provided by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012). They show that multinational banks mitigate domestic 
liquidity shocks via a cross-border flow of funds within the organization.  
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specifically taken for macroprudential purposes. In our analysis, we exploit information on adjustments to capital 
requirements, reserve requirements and lending standards.13 Information on capital requirements includes changes 
in the level of both overall capital requirements and sector specific capital requirements such as changes in risk 
weights. Lending standards encompass changes to loan-to-value ratios, loan/debt-to-income ratios, and other 
changes in underwriting standards. We are also able to observe changes in reserve requirements which traditionally 
are not considered to be a macroprudential tool, but they are often used for financial stability purposes and are 
therefore likely to have macroprudential consequences. 
To estimate the effect of these regulatory changes on the scale of banks’ business activities via their multinational 
operations, we use quarterly banks’ balance sheet information provided by the Bank of England. This dataset 
contains financial information for all banks operating in the UK between 1997q4 and 2014q1. We use data on 
lending provided by foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries and we are able to distinguish between the lending 
provided to other banks (Interbank lending) and non-banks (Non-bank lending). We also obtain country-level 
information provided by the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook and the Bank of International 
Settlements. Specifically, we retrieve data on quarterly GDP growth rates, household debt, and level of domestic 
lending provided by domestic banks in each country in our sample.    
Financial data are available for 15,148 observations for 497 foreign banks (both branches and subsidiaries) 
operating during our sample period. We map regulatory data into this dataset and restrict our sample to institutions 
which belong to a banking group operating at least one branch and subsidiary over the sample period. This is 
crucial for our identification strategy because it allows us to control for banking group-time-varying factors 
affecting lending by branches and subsidiaries of these groups in the UK. However, it also restricts our sample size 
to 4,107 observations. The number of banks in our final sample is reduced to 103 banks which belong to 38 
banking groups (51 branches and 52 subsidiaries). These banks however, account for approximately 75% of the 
total foreign banks’ assets in the UK. We also observe 40% of all of the macroprudential regulatory changes in our 
original dataset. Our sample includes 19 cases of capital requirements tightening, 23 cases of lending standards 
tightening and 35 cases of reserve requirements tightening.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our dependent and explanatory variables as well as timing of regulatory 
changes. Panel A of Table 1 shows that banks included in the final sample are very similar in terms of dependent 
and explanatory variables to all foreign banks operating in the UK during the sample period, which allows us to 
believe the final sample of foreign banks is a good representation of all foreign institutions operating in the UK 
during this time period. 
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 Other types of macroprudential regulation do not vary sufficiently over time during our sample period and therefore are excluded from the 
analysis. 
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Table 1 
Sample representativeness and summary statistics 
Panel A: Sample representativeness 
All banks Banks in the sample 
Observations Mean Observations Mean 
Non-bank lending growth 15,148 0.023 4,107 0.035 
Interbank lending growth 15,148 0.044 4,107 0.050 
Bank size (ln total assets) 15,148 14.084 4,107 15.216 
Interbank share 15,148 0.729 4,107 0.672 
Panel B: Regulatory changes and number of banks 
Total  Included in the sample 
Capital requirements tightening 43 24 
Lending standards tightening 75 25 
Reserve requirements tightening 73 38 
All foreign banks 497 103 
Foreign banks’ branches 321 51 
Foreign banks’ subsidiaries 176 52 
Panel C: Summary statistics 
Variable  N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Dependent variables 
Non-bank lending growth 4,107 0.035 0.243 -0.42 0.62 Bank of England 
Interbank lending growth 4,107 0.050 0.306 -0.51 0.89 Bank of England 
Regulatory dummies 
Capital requirements tightening 4,107 0.006 0.078 0 1 IMF/BIS 
Lending standards tightening 4,107 0.015 0.124 0 1 IMF/BIS 
Reserve requirements tightening 4,107 0.009 0.097 0 1 IMF/BIS 
Control variables 
Bank size (ln total assets) 4,107 15.216 2.250 6.03 20.21 Bank of England 
Interbank share 4,107 0.672 0.320 0.02 0.97 Bank of England 
GDP growth  4,001 2.097 2.312 -1.965 6.074 IMF/BIS 
Household debt (ln) 4,001 0.929 0.458 0.266 1.912 IMF/BIS 
Domestic lending (ln) 4,001 1.048 0.613 0.367 2.236 IMF/BIS 
Panel D: Timing of changes to macroprudential regulation 
Capital requirements Lending standards Reserve requirements 
Country Quarter Country Quarter Country Quarter Country Quarter 
Australia 1998q3 
 
Portugal 1998q4 
 
Philippines 1998q2 China 2007q4 
South Africa 1998q4 
 
Portugal 1999q1 
 
France 1998q4 India 2007q4 
Philippines 1998q4 
 
China 2001q1 
 
Philippines 1998q4 China 2008q1a 
China 2002q1 
 
Ireland 2001q4 
 
Germany 1999q1 China 2008q2a 
Australia 2004q4 
 
China 2003q2 
 
Portugal 1999q1 India 2009q4a 
India 2004q4 
 
Italy 2004q1 
 
France 1999q1 India 2010q1 
India 2005q1 
 
China 2004q3 
 
Spain 1999q1 China 2010q1 
India 2005q3 
 
China 2005q1 
 
Greece 1999q3 India 2010q2 
India 2005q4 
 
Greece 2005q4 
 
Italy 2000q1 China 2010q2 
Ireland 2006q1 
 
China 2006q1 
 
France 2000q1 China 2010q4 
Ireland 2006q2 
 
China 2006q2 
 
Ireland 2000q1 China 2011q1 
India 2006q2 
 
France 2007q1 
 
Germany 2000q1 China 2011q2 
India 2006q3 
 
Canada 2008q4a 
 
Greece 2000q2 China 2011q3 
India 2006q4 
 
China 2009q4a 
 
India 2000q3 
India 2007q1 
 
India 2010q1 
 
Greece 2001q1 
Italy 2007q1 
 
China 2010q1 
 
China 2003q3 
Spain 2008q1a 
 
Canada 2010q2 
 
China 2004q2 
Spain 2008q2a 
 
Canada 2011q1 
 
India 2004q3 
India 2008q2a 
 
Canada 2011q2 
 
Switzerland 2005q1 
Switzerland 2009q1a 
 
Canada 2011q4 
 
China 2006q3 
India 2009q4a 
 
India 2011q4 
 
China 2006q4 
India 2010q3 
 
Canada 2012q3 
 
China 2007q1 
India 2010q4 
 
Canada 2013q1 
 
India 2007q1 
Switzerland 2012q2 
 
China 2013q1 
 
China 2007q2 
USA 2014q1 
 
China 2007q3 
Notes. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample and information on the timing of changes to macroprudential regulation. a) Excluded from the main analysis due to 
occurrence during the crisis period. 
 
3. Identification strategy  
3.1 Overall effect  
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We exploit cross-country cross-time variation in the tightening of macroprudential regulation and rely on 
difference-in-differences estimations. We begin by examining the overall effect of tighter capital requirements, 
lending standards and reserve requirements. We test if more stringent macroprudential regulation affects 
multinational banks’ lending in the host country irrespective of their organizational form.  
Although this analysis is not the central point of this paper, it allows us to establish whether macroprudential 
regulation tightening has an absolute effect on banks’ cross-border lending. This is important, since a decrease in 
lending provided by branches might be offset by an increase in lending provided by subsidiaries (or vice versa), in 
which case the net effect of these regulatory changes could be insignificant.  
We compare changes in the evolution of lending prior to and following the introduction of the change to 
macroprudential regulation between the treatment and control group. The treatment group consists of multinational 
banks operating in the UK which are subject to higher capital requirements and reserve requirements, and stricter 
lending standards imposed in their home countries. The control group includes foreign banks from countries which 
do not alter macroprudential regulation during our sample period. We estimate the following model: 
∆yijkt = αi+β(Regulationkt)+φBCit+δCCkt+γi+γt+εijkt,  , (1) 
where Δyijkt denotes the percentage point change in lending by bank i, which is part of banking group j, from 
country k, in quarter t. The main explanatory variable Regulation takes a value of 1 for quarters and countries when 
a tightening of macroprudential regulation took place and 0 otherwise. The coefficient β provides information on 
the response of both branches and subsidiaries to changes in macroprudential regulation.   
These regressions include bank-time varying control variables, a proxy for the size of the institution (log of total 
assets: Bank size (ln)) and a proxy that controls for the differences in banks’ business models (share of interbank 
lending: Interbank share), denoted by BCit. Bank size captures the fact that large banks both benefit from implicit 
guarantees but also have a bigger investor and asset base to draw on when raising capital. The interbank share 
allows us to control for the level of interbank loans provided by both branches and subsidiaries. This is important 
since reductions surrounding one type of lending following a tightening of macroprudential regulation could be 
partly driven by the level of this lending. 
In addition to bank-time varying variables, we include country-time varying factors which are likely to affect 
multinational banks’ cross-border lending, denoted by CCit. We control for countrys’ GDP growth, level of 
household debt and total domestic lending provided by domestic banks. These proxies allow us to control for 
demand conditions in the home countries of the banks included in the sample. Each regression includes a set of 
bank (γi) and quarter (γt) dummy variables to control for all bank time invariant factors, such as differences in banks 
business model, and time-varying bank-invariant factors, controlling for example for business cycles. 
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3.2 Main analysis: Differential effects 
The core part of our analysis again relies on difference-in-difference estimations and compares changes in the 
evolution of lending prior to and following the introduction of the change to macroprudential regulation between 
treatment and control group. Here however, the treatment group consists of foreign branches affected by the change 
in macroprudential regulation. The control group consists of foreign subsidiaries affected by tighter 
macroprudential regulation, as well as subsidiaries and branches of banks whose home country regulators did not 
introduce changes to macroprudential regulation.14 To test for the existence of differential effects we estimate the 
following model:  
∆yijkt = αi+β(Regulationkt*Typeijk)+φBCit+γi+γjkt+εijkt, (2) 
where Δyijkt denotes the percentage point change in lending by bank i, which is part of banking group j, from 
country k, in quarter t. The main explanatory variable is an interaction term between the dummy variable 
Regulation and dummy variable Type. Regulation takes a value of 1 for quarters and countries when a tightening of 
macroprudential regulation took place, and 0 otherwise.15 Type takes value of 1 for branches of foreign banks, and a 
value of 0 for subsidiaries. The coefficient β provides information on the difference in the response between 
branches and subsidiaries to changes in macroprudential regulation.   
Our regressions include two bank-time varying control variables denoted by BCijkt. Specifically, we control for the 
size of foreign affiliates using log of total assets (Bank size (ln)) and differences in the bank type business models, 
including the share of interbank lending of each foreign affiliate (Interbank share).  
The volume of credit provided by foreign affiliates of multinational banks will depend on the decisions and strategy 
of their parent banks. Therefore, to identify heterogeneous effects of regulatory changes on lending provided by 
branches and subsidiaries, we need to control for all the factors affecting parent banks (i.e. demand for parent bank 
products in the home market, strength of parent banks’ balance sheets, or macroeconomic conditions in the home 
market). Focusing our analysis on branches and subsidiaries belonging to the same banking groups allows us to 
introduce banking group-time-varying fixed effects, γjkt, which eliminate all time varying parent bank-specific and 
home country-specific sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally, we also control for all time invariant 
bank-specific factors including bank fixed effects, γi. 
3.2 Difference-in-difference assumptions 
The difference-in-difference estimates are valid under two assumptions. The first is that the treatment event, a 
change in macroprudential regulation policy is exogenous. In other words, changes in macroprudential regulation in 
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 In Table 11 Panel A we show results of tests with an alternative control group. This alternative control group is restricted to include of 
only subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in the UK which were subject to tighter macroprudential regulation introduced in their home 
countries. These results are identical to the ones obtained with a full sample. 
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 In unreported tests we use an alternative Regulation variable, taking values of -1 if regulation is loosened in country k at time t, and 0 
otherwise. We do not observe in our sample loosening of capital requirements nor lending standards. However, we do observe 4 cases of 
reserve requirements loosening. Accounting for loosening cases in our specification yields exactly the same results, which are available upon 
request. 
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the home country should not depend on the lending provided by foreign branches and subsidiaries in the UK. The 
second, (the parallel trends assumption) is that the evolution of lending growth in treatment and control groups is 
similar prior to the change in the macroprudential regulation. This assumption allows us to believe that absent 
changes in macroprudential regulation both branches and subsidiaries’ lending would continue to evolve in a 
similar way and any divergences in lending are due to changes in regulation. In this section we discuss results of 
tests providing support for the validity of both assumptions. 
3.2.1 Treatment exogeneity assumption 
To formally test whether macroprudential policies at home are not driven by lending growth abroad, we use linear 
probability model estimations. We examine whether lending provided by foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries 
in the UK, increases or decreases the probability of observing changes in the stringency of macroprudential 
regulation in the country of origin of their parent bank. To perform this analysis, we collapse our data at the 
country-level and model the likelihood of the home country of the parent bank tightening its regulation as a 
function of mean lending growth of foreign branches and subsidiaries abroad. Given that we are interested in 
exploring whether macroprudential regulation differentially affects lending provided by branches and subsidiaries 
of foreign banks in the UK, we also test whether the differences in lending growth rates between these two types of 
institutions affect the probability of observing changes in macroprudential regulation. To perform this analysis, we 
calculate the difference between mean lending growth provided by branches and subsidiaries in the year of 
regulatory change and three periods preceding these regulatory changes. Next, we again collapse our data on the 
country-level. If our assumption is valid, we expect lending growth by foreign branches and subsidiaries (in 
absolute terms and differences) not to impact the probability of the home country tightening its prudential policies. 
Table 2 presents the results. Panel A shows the results of regressions where we include the contemporaneous and 
three lags of the mean lending growth rates. Panel B presents the results of regressions including the 
contemporaneous and three lags of the mean differences in lending growth rates.16 Across all specifications, the 
coefficient on the main variables of interest remains statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that 
neither the volume of banks’ cross-border lending, nor the difference in the volume of cross-border lending 
provided in the UK by foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries, play significant role in the bank regulators’ 
decision to change macroprudential regulation.17  
3.2.2 Parallel trends assumption 
To test the parallel trends assumption, we begin with a graphical illustration presented in Figure 2. In each of the 
graphs we plot the development in the mean lending growth for both types of institutions over the three quarters 
preceding each change in macroprudential regulation. Foreign banks’ branches’ lending growth is denoted by a 
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 Including a higher number of lags also yields insignificant results. 
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 In addition, we also estimate these regressions using complementary log-log regressions and logit regressions. Results of these regressions 
are again insignificant and are available upon request. 
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blue solid line and triangles, whereas the trend in the lending growth of foreign banks’ subsidiaries is denoted by a 
red dashed line.  
Table 2 
Simultaneity bias tests 
Panel A: Effect of average bank lending 
Capital requirements tightening Lending standards tightening Reserve requirements tightening 
                    
Non-bank lending (t)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.11) (-0.18) (-1.11) (-0.85) (-0.23) (-0.17) 
Non-bank lending (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.52) (-0.57) (0.52) (0.13) (0.87) (0.83) 
Non-bank lending (t-2) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.88) (-0.88) (-0.68) (-0.76) (0.42) (0.38) 
Non-bank lending (t-3) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.59) (-0.60) (-1.30) (-1.28) (-0.41) (-0.41) 
Interbank lending (t) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (1.19) (1.18) 
Interbank lending (t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.46) (0.48) (0.29) (0.32) (-0.10) (-0.09) 
Interbank lending (t-2) 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
(1.18) (1.24) (-1.58) (-1.51) (-0.09) (-0.07) 
Interbank lending (t-3) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
(0.11) (0.20) (1.26) (1.34) (0.73) (0.60) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.170 0.166 0.168 0.219 0.218 0.219 
Panel B: Effect of the difference between average lending provided by branches and subsidiaries 
Capital requirements tightening Lending standards tightening Reserve requirements tightening 
                  
Non-bank lending (t)  0.031 0.032 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.012 
(1.08) (1.09) (0.14) (0.20) (0.54) (0.46) 
Non-bank lending (t-1) 0.020 0.018 0.031 0.033 0.017 0.016 
(1.05) (0.96) (1.01) (1.10) (0.54) (0.54) 
Non-bank lending (t-2) 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.008 
(0.70) (0.64) (-0.13) (-0.10) (0.33) (0.45) 
Non-bank lending (t-3) -0.016 -0.019 -0.011 -0.012 0.022 0.020 
(-1.07) (-1.27) (-1.25) (-1.08) (1.55) (1.50) 
Interbank lending (t) 0.024 0.026 -0.010 -0.011 0.008 0.005 
(1.30) (1.33) (-0.57) (-0.60) (0.34) (0.25) 
Interbank lending (t-1) 0.016 0.018 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
(1.31) (1.41) (-0.42) (-0.31) (-0.10) (-0.11) 
Interbank lending (t-2) 0.016 0.015 -0.008 -0.007 0.028 0.026 
(1.03) (1.05) (-0.52) (-0.46) (0.77) (0.73) 
Interbank lending (t-3) 0.023 0.021 -0.045* -0.046* 0.010 0.010 
(1.30) (1.24) (-2.28) (-2.32) (0.28) (0.27) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.232 0.226 0.224 0.175 0.166 0.174 0.223 0.223 0.218 
Notes. Table 2 presents results of Linear Probability Model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if tightening of Capital requirements, Lending standards or 
Reserve requirements takes place in country i in quarter t. Explanatory variables include mean interbank and non-bank lending provided by banks from country i in the UK (Panel A) 
or difference in the mean interbank and non-bank lending provided by branches and subsidiaries. Each regression includes contemporaneous and three lags of main explanatory 
variables. Control variables include mean total assets and share of interbank loans of foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries operating in the UK. Additionally, regressions include 
country and quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.     
 
Panel A illustrates the evolution in lending to non-bank borrowers (Non-bank lending) and Panel B illustrates the 
evolution in interbank lending. In most cases, growth of lending provided by branches and subsidiaries exhibits a 
very similar pattern, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption is met. Note that this assumption does not 
require identical levels of lending growth between treatment and control groups as they are differenced out. In other 
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words, this assumption requires a similar trend in the growth rates of our dependent variables; however, it does not 
require growth rates to be at the same level (Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). 
Figure 2 
Parallel trends assumption 
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Notes: Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of quarterly changes in the dependent variables for three quarters preceding changes in macroprudential regulation tightening. Branches of 
foreign banks (the treatment group) are represented by a triangle and solid line, whereas foreign banks’ subsidiaries (the control group) are depicted by a dashed line. Non-bank 
lending refers to foreign banks’ lending to the private non-bank UK sector and interbank lending to foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. 
 
As an additional check, we follow Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and conduct t-tests for the differences in the 
changes of quarterly growth rates of interbank and non-bank lending provided by branches and subsidiaries of 
foreign banks in the UK. We compare the difference in the changes of quarterly growth rates in three quarters 
preceding the implementation of tighter capital requirements, lending standards or reserve requirements. A lack of 
statistically significant differences in the evolution of lending growth rates between subsidiaries and branches prior 
to regulatory changes would strengthen our inferences from the visual inspection in Figure 2. 
Table 3 shows the results of these tests for three quarters prior to changes to capital requirements (Panel A), lending 
standards (Panel B) and reserve requirements (Panel C). In each panel, we compare growth rates of both lending 
categories. In all but one case these differences are not significantly different from zero. This suggests that prior to 
regulatory changes, the evolution in foreign banks’ lending does not vary with the organizational form of the 
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institution. Therefore, as discussed, we could expect that the potential differences are the result of changes in the 
macroprudential regulation rather than pre-treatment trends in the evolution of lending stemming from individual 
characteristics of branches and subsidiaries (e.g. different business models). 
Table 3 
Parallel trends assumption 
Panel A: Capital requirements 
 
Period t-3 Period t-2 Period t-1 
 
Difference t-statistic Wilcoxon  (p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
Non-bank lending growth -0.011 -0.92 0.36 0.005 0.29 0.77 -0.008 -0.29 0.82 
Interbank lending growth -0.021 -1.80 0.03* -0.002 -0.15 0.98 -0.027 -0.87 0.39 
Panel B: Lending standards 
 
Period t-3 Period t-2 Period t-1 
 
Difference t-statistic Wilcoxon  (p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) 
Non-bank lending growth -0.015 -0.86 0.18 -0.005 -0.57 0.56 -0.021 -1.66 0.11 
Interbank lending growth -0.012 -1.18 0.14 -0.004 -0.25 0.31 -0.008 -0.69 0.67 
Panel C: Reserve requirements 
 
Period t-3 Period t-2 Period t-1 
 
Difference t-statistic Wilcoxon  (p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) Difference t-statistic 
Wilcoxon  
(p-value) 
Non-bank lending growth -0.037 -1.75 0.19 0.007 0.47 0.55 -0.024 -1.55 0.15 
Interbank lending growth -0.006 -0.42 0.62 -0.021 -1.25 0.16 -0.022 -1.41 0.17 
Notes. Table 3 presents the results of t-tests examining parallel trends assumption. We test for the differences in mean lending growth rates (both interbank and Non-bank lending) in 
three quarters preceding tightening of capital requirements (Panel A), lending standards (Panel B) and reserve requirements (Panel C). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Overall effect results 
Table 4 presents the results for the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening on foreign banks’ lending in the 
UK irrespective of their organizational form, obtained using equation 1. We remove the years 2008 and 2009 to 
avoid our estimates being driven by an extraordinary high frequency of regulatory changes during the crisis 
period.18 We winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th percentile. We cluster standard errors at the institutions’ 
home country level to account for serial correlation within each panel (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Duflo, 2004).  
We find that changes in lending standards positively affect foreign multinational banks’ lending to the UK’s non-
bank borrowers. Following tightening of lending standards, foreign banks increase their lending to non-bank 
borrowers by 5.9 pp. This finding is in line with the results obtained by Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013) who 
found that stricter lending standards in the home country are associated with laxer lending standards of 
multinational banks’ in host countries. The fact that banks are lending to riskier borrowers, and therefore a wider 
pool of borrowers makes it plausible that multinational banks increase their overall lending output in the host 
countries. 
Table 4 also reports a statistically significant effect of capital requirements tightening on interbank lending. We 
find that foreign banks operating in the UK reduce their lending to other banks operating in the UK by 
approximately 8.2 pp. We find that lending standards and reserve requirements have no effect on banks’ cross-
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 We also performed our tests including the crisis period and the results are very similar to those presented in the paper.  
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border lending. A significant effect of capital requirements tightening on foreign banks’ lending to other banks is 
consistent with other findings in the literature such as Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014) 
who document a significant reduction in lending for banks but not to non-banks following an increase in capital 
requirements. We conjecture that this is because non-bank lending is more likely to be relationship-based and more 
profitable. Reducing non-bank lending may hamper lending relationships which may be costly for banks, and 
therefore institutions subject to tighter capital requirements may refrain from reducing non-bank loans.19 In 
contrast, banks are generally able to substitute funding in the interbank market easily; this means that any attempt 
to pass on increased capital costs by an affected branch will be swiftly met by a bank finding an alternative lender, 
while a subsidiary will be less affected by the increased cost and so banks are less likely to find an alternative 
source of borrowing. Additionally, interbank lending is typically of shorter maturity than lending to non-bank 
borrowers, which also allows banks to adjust this type of lending more quickly.20 
Table 4 
Macroprudential regulation and banks’ cross-border lending 
Non-bank lending Interbank lending 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Capital regulation 0.036 0.037 -0.082** -0.082** 
(1.69) (1.72) (-2.46) (-2.41) 
Lending standards 0.059** 0.060** 0.013 0.013 
(2.54) (2.61) (0.64) (0.63) 
Reserve requirements 0.018 0.022 0.020 0.020 
(0.43) (0.52) (0.47) (0.47) 
Bank size (ln) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.027** 0.028** 0.028** 0.027** 
(-0.23) (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.26) (2.70) (2.72) (2.72) (2.71) 
Interbank share -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.213*** -0.211*** 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 
(-8.70) (-8.39) (-8.56) (-8.66) (6.50) (6.58) (6.58) (6.54) 
GDP growth  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.32) (1.35) (1.41) (1.45) (1.20) (1.20) (1.03) (1.02) 
Household debt (ln) -0.097 -0.097 -0.102 -0.100 -0.336* -0.337* -0.328* -0.326* 
(-1.05) (-1.00) (-1.12) (-1.03) (-2.10) (-2.12) (-2.07) (-2.04) 
Domestic lending (ln) 0.032 0.030 0.036 0.033 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.420*** 0.419*** 
(0.42) (0.37) (0.49) (0.42) (4.89) (4.87) (4.77) (4.71) 
Observations 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 
R-squared 0.076 0.074 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 4 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on the lending of foreign banks in the UK. We 
estimate the following model: ∆yijkt = αi+β(Regulationkt)+φBCit+δCCkt+γi+γt+εijkt. Our dependent variables include foreign banks’ lending to the UK non-bank sector and foreign 
banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage point growth rates. The main explanatory variable Regulation, a dummy for regulatory change, equal 
to 1 if regulation is tightened in country i at quarter t, and 0 for all other periods. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening on 
foreign banks’ lending in the UK irrespective of their organizational form. The set of bank-time varying control variables BC include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size 
(ln)), and the share of interbank lending (Interbank share). Country-time varying control variables (CC) control for countrys’ GDP growth, level of household debt, and total 
domestic lending provided by domestic banks. Additionally, regressions include bank and quarter fixed effects. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors 
are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Our argument that the lack of an effect on non-bank lending could be due to relationship lending is supported by the results presented in 
Table B.1. We interact Type, Regulation with the log of total assets, our proxy for size. We find that larger banks which are less likely to rely 
on soft information acquired through repeated interactions with the borrower reduce their interbank lending less than smaller institutions 
which operations are more likely to be relationship based. At the same time, larger banks are more likely to reduce non-bank lending more 
than smaller banks, however this this effect is not statistically significant. These results support the idea that the lack of a significant effect on 
non-bank lending is due to the fact that banks try to avoid damaging their relationships with borrowers. This hypothesis is also supported by 
the results presented in Panel A of Table 6. We show that banks whose business model relies more on the provision of non-bank lending (and 
therefore lending relationships) are more likely to contract their interbank lending exposures more than banks which business model relies on 
the provision of interbank loans.    
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 In Appendix B, Table B.2 we perform an additional analysis by looking at the response of foreign branches and subsidiaries to tighter 
capital requirements separately. We repeat the estimations in Table 4 but instead of including all institutions in the estimation, we first use a 
sample consisting of only branches and then repeat this for only subsidiaries. We find a negative and statistically significant effect of capital 
requirements tightening for the former group. The subsidiaries’ response also seems to be negative although much smaller in magnitude and 
not statistically significant. We also find a positive effect of lending standards on lending to customers for both branches and subsidiaries. 
However, this effect is significant at 10% level only for branches of multinational banks.  
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4.2 Differential effects 
Having discussed the absolute effect of macroprudential tightening, we now turn to the main analysis of this paper.   
Table 5 presents the results of tests examining the differential effect of macroprudential regulation obtained with 
Equation 2. In addition, we also perform an analysis where we substitute banking group-specific fixed effects with 
country-specific fixed effects (Column 1 and 6) to highlight the importance of controlling for banking group 
specific factors that are likely to affect our dependent variables. Each regression controls for the size of the 
institution measured as the logarithm of total assets (Bank size (ln)), and share of interbank loans to total loans 
(Interbank share). As above, we remove the years 2008 and 2009 to avoid our estimates being driven by an 
extraordinary high frequency of regulatory changes during the crisis period.  
Columns 1 to 5 show the effect of changes in foreign banks’ home country macroprudential regulation on lending 
provided by foreign branches and subsidiaries to the non-bank sector in the UK. Column 1 and 2 report regression 
results of the model, which includes interactions between the Type dummy and all the regulatory dummies. The 
coefficients show that following a tightening of capital requirements, branches reduce their lending growth by 
7.3pp more relative to subsidiaries when we do not control banking group specific factors. However, t-statistics of -
0.90 suggest that this effect is not statistically significant at any conventional level. When banking group-quarter 
fixed effects are included in the model, the effect is much weaker (2.1 percentage point reduction) and again 
statistically insignificant. Similarly, the t-statistic for the coefficients on the interactions between the Type and the 
lending standards and reserve requirements variables shows that the effect of these regulations cannot be 
distinguished from zero. The results in Column 1 and 2 are reinforced by the results in Columns 3-5, where we 
include interaction terms for each regulation individually in each regression. Again, none of the interaction terms 
exhibit statistically significant effects on non-bank lending growth.  
In Table 4 we find that foreign banks’ affiliates operating in the UK significantly increase their lending to non-bank 
borrowers, irrespective of their organizational form. However, in Table 5, we do not find support for the existence 
of differential effects for lending standards. Why might there be no differential effect? Lending standards 
regulation - unlike capital requirements - applies to specific domestic products and is not applied to the balance 
sheet of the consolidated group. Since parent banks’ balance sheets remain unaffected (in terms of compliance with 
tighter lending standards) by risk taking of their foreign affiliates, it is possible that the parent bank will allow both 
foreign branches and subsidiaries to increase lending. Additionally, a tightening of lending standards, unlike capital 
requirements, appears to incentivise the parent bank to increase lending in foreign markets, which is evident from 
Table 4 (and supported by the evidence provided by Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013) as well as Hills, Reinhardt, 
Sowerbutts and Wieladek (2017). In other words, a tightening of capital requirements may increase constraints (if 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem is violated as discussed), whereas a tightening of lending standard regulations may 
actually loosen constraints. But, convincing subsidiaries’ boards of directors to increase lending may be potentially 
easier than convincing it to reduce lending and we would thus expect weaker differential effects in the case of a 
loosening of constraints.  
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The coefficient in Column 2 of Table 5 suggests that the difference in magnitude of the coefficient on the 
interaction term between Lending standards and Type is economically insignificant (Coefficient: -0.001) which 
supports our hypothesis. 
 
Table 5 
Macroprudential regulation and banks’ cross-border lending: Differential effects 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Capital 
regulation*Type -0.073 -0.021 -0.021   -0.044*** -0.057** -0.058**   
(-0.90) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-3.70) (-2.27) (-2.50) 
Lending 
standards*Type -0.046 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.024 0.025 
(-0.45) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.19) (0.59) (0.59) 
Reserve 
requirements*Type -0.005 -0.012 -0.012 0.068 0.092 0.092 
(-0.07) (-0.12) (-0.12) (0.97) (0.96) (0.97) 
           
Bank size (ln) 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.034** 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.032 
(0.16) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.10) (2.61) (1.34) (1.35) (1.35) (1.34) 
Interbank share -0.239*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.247*** 0.227*** 0.214* 0.212* 0.211* 0.215* 
(-9.07) (-6.48) (-6.56) (-6.53) (-6.49) (4.04) (1.93) (1.91) (1.92) (1.93) 
Observations 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.264 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.315 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569 
Group*Quarter FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Country*Quarter FE YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 5 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the differential effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign banks in the UK. 
We estimate the following model: ∆yijkt = αi+β(Regulationkt*Typeijk)+φBCit+γi+γjkt+εijkt. Our dependent variables include foreign banks’ lending to the UK non-bank sector and 
foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage point growth rates. The main explanatory variable is an interaction term between Regulation 
and Type. Regulation is a dummy for regulatory change, equal to 1 if regulation is tightened in country i at quarter t, and 0 for all other periods. Type is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if foreign bank operates in the UK as a branch, and 0 if it operates as a subsidiary. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening. 
The set of bank-time varying control variables, BC include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size (ln)), and the share of interbank lending (Interbank share). Additionally, 
regressions include bank fixed effects and banking group-quarter fixed effects. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home 
country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Columns 5 to 8 show the results for the effect of macroprudential regulation on interbank lending provided by 
foreign banks in the UK. We first report the estimates for the tests where the interactions between Type and all 
three regulations are included simultaneously. We find heterogeneity in lending provided by branches and 
subsidiaries in response to changes in capital requirements. When we do not control for banking group specific 
factors, our results suggest that foreign banks’ branches reduce lending to other banks operating in the UK by 4.4 
pp more than subsidiaries following a tightening of capital requirements. This effect is significant at the 1% level 
(t-statistic of -3.70).  Including banking group-quarter dummy variables increases the magnitude of the coefficient 
on the interaction term between Capital requirements and Type to 5.7 pp (coefficient -0.057). This suggests that 
foreign banks’ branches reduce their interbank lending by 5.7 pp more than subsidiaries following a tightening of 
capital requirements. This effect is again significant, at 5% level (t-statistic of -2.27). The economic magnitude of 
this effect is also large. The mean interbank lending growth in our sample is 5pp. For a mean bank, the coefficient 
of -0.057 (or -5.7pp) translates into a reduction of interbank lending growth rate from 5pp to -0.7pp. 
The remaining coefficients on reserve requirements and lending standards again lack statistical significance with t-
statistics of 0.59 and 0.96, respectively. In columns 8 to 10, we report the estimates of regressions where the effect 
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of each regulatory change is evaluated individually. Estimates of these tests support the results in Column 7. The 
coefficient on capital requirements is again negative and statistically significant, whilst the coefficients for our two 
additional regulation variables remain indistinguishable from zero. 
Among the control variables, we find that the size of the foreign affiliate does not influence lending, whereas the 
share of the interbank loans significantly correlates only with non-bank private sector loans. The negative sign of 
the coefficient suggests that a greater focus on interbank lending provision decreases the reduction in the growth 
rate of loans to the non-bank sector.   
Our baseline results suggest that tighter capital regulation in the home country has a stronger effect on lending 
provided by multinational banks’ branches compared to subsidiaries. These results are in line with our predictions. 
A greater degree of control by the parent bank over its affiliates operating in the form of a branch makes it easier to 
reduce the banking group’s risk-weighted assets through contractions of branch lending. But we only find 
heterogeneity in the provision of interbank lending.  
4.3 Transmission mechanism  
The results in Table 5 show that foreign banks’ branches reduce their interbank lending more than the subsidiaries 
of foreign banks in response to tightening of capital requirements in their parent bank country. Our presumption is 
that these differential effects may, at least in part, stem from parent banks’ ability to easily and swiftly adjust the 
balance sheets of their foreign branches, relative to their subsidiaries. In the case of affiliates operating under a 
subsidiary structure, parent banks’ decisions often require approval of subsidiaries’ boards of directors. Given this, 
it is more difficult or time consuming for parent banks to influence lending decisions of subsidiaries to adapt to the 
new regulatory requirements. In this section, we provide evidence for the validity of our hypothesis.  
To construct tests which support our presumption, we follow the literature on delegation of authority within firms, 
which predicts that in certain circumstances delegating authority may have beneficial effects for firms’ 
performance. Aghion and Tirole (1997) consider delegation of authority to subordinates as an incentive mechanism 
for information production, particularly the production of ‘soft’ information. In their model, a principal (senior 
manager) has power to overturn the agents’ (subordinates') decisions. However, the principal often refrains from 
exercising this power, and grants authority to subordinates who have better access to soft information to spur 
information production (Agrawal and Hauswald, 2010). We relate these predictions to financial intermediation, and 
in particular, multinational banks. In our context, we assume that parent banks delegate more decision making 
authority to their foreign affiliates, the more non-bank lending the banking group provides. This is because non-
bank lending - unlike interbank lending - relies to a large extent on relationships between banks and borrowers, and 
thus relies on the collection of soft information (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005; Berger and Udell, 
2002; Stein, 2002). Conversely, parent banks will hold more decision making authority over the business activities 
of their foreign affiliates the more interbank lending they provide, and therefore the more they rely on hard 
information. 
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McAfee and McMillan (1995) consider that principals require time to supervise the actions of their subordinates. 
Since their time is limited, they will need to delegate some power to subprincipals. This implies that hierarchical 
structures, where at least part of the decision making power is delegated to subprincipals, could be more beneficial 
for banking groups which operate a higher number of foreign affiliates. Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) 
suggest that decentralisation could be beneficial for multidivisional corporations when coordination becomes 
important. These authors argue that companies with multiple divisions can benefit under decentralized decision 
making structures from improved communication, which in turn improves firm performance. Relating these 
predictions to our paper, delegation should be more pronounced in banking groups which operate more foreign 
affiliates. 
Dessein (2002) suggests that delegating authority to subordinates allows companies to avoid noisy communication 
and loss of information which, in turn, subsequently improves decision making efficiency. In his model, principals 
and agents have different objectives (agents may be more short-term biased, or more risk averse). To meet their 
objectives, agents may miscommunicate information supplied to the principal, therefore generating noisy 
information and/or causing loss of information. To reduce this effect, principals may delegate more authority to the 
agent. Dessein’s (2002) model predicts that the benefits of delegating authority outweigh the principal’s loss of 
decision making control the more relevant is the information obtained by the agent.  
In our context, we argue that the relevance of information about local market conditions in the UK obtained by 
foreign affiliates of multinational banks in the UK outweighs parent banks’ loss of control involved with delegation 
of decision making authority to these foreign affiliates. This prediction is supported by the results in the empirical 
literature. Agarwal and Hauswald (2009) document that geographical proximity between the lender and the 
borrower improves collection of relevant information used by financial intermediaries for credit decisions. Landier, 
Nair and Wulf (2007) suggest that firms’ geographical dispersion impedes flow of such information within the 
organization. Finally, Agarwal and Hauswald (2009) test the predictions in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein 
(2002), and document that headquarters of major U.S. banks delegate more decision making authority to their units 
operating in further geographical distance from the headquarter. The better the office is at obtaining the soft 
information, the more autonomous they are in credit decisions, and the more information they produce.21 In sum, 
we expect the differential effects found in Table 5 to be stronger for banking groups located at further geographical 
distances from their parent bank’s headquarters. 
Three aspects relating to the delegation literature require further explanation if these are supposed to help us test for 
the transmission mechanism.  
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 Agrawal and Hauswald (2009) consider delegation of authority between banks’ headquarters and their branches. The authors only have 
data for branches of these banks and therefore are not able to test this mechanism for subsidiaries. However, their results should apply even 
more to affiliated subsidiaries. Unlike branches, decisions regarding subsidiaries’ operations are decided by the subsidiaries’ boards of 
directors. Branch operations are directly overseen by the parent banks’ boards. In addition, foreign subsidiaries in our sample mainly focus 
on provision of non-bank loans requiring collection of ‘soft’ information.  
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The first aspect relates to the fact that decision making authority can be delegated by the parent bank to foreign 
affiliates operating under a subsidiary as well as a branch structure. Williamson (1967) suggests that under more 
complex hierarchical structures, principals substitute information quality for information quantity. Because 
subsidiaries have their own boards of directors, their hierarchical structure is more complex relative to branches. 
Therefore, in line with Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) and Dessein’s (2002) predictions, multinational banks should 
find it more beneficial to delegate more autonomy to affiliated subsidiaries. Second, the above literature considers 
delegation to be advantageous mainly through improved collection and flow of soft information. In the case of 
financial intermediaries, such information is obtained through lending relationships attributed to non-bank lending. 
One could conjecture that delegation could affect banks’ lending to non-financial borrowers to a greater extent. 
However, it is very unlikely that parent banks will delegate decision making authority to their foreign affiliates for 
only a subset of the lending operation that it does. The third aspect is the principal, in our case the parent bank 
always holds the right to reverse delegation. According to Hart and Holmstrom (2010) delegation is a commitment 
device, breaching which could have negative consequences, leading to aggravation among the subordinates and 
affect firms’ performance. Therefore, the principal will refrain from reversing delegation. Knyazeva, Knyazeva and 
Masulis (2013) document that interfering in the independence of the board leads to adverse firm valuation and 
performance effects of subsidiaries. Therefore, it might be much costlier for the parent bank to overrule the 
decisions of subsidiaries’ boards compared to branch managers. 
Taking all these theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence together, we should observe stronger differential 
effects, as found in Table 5, for banking groups which rely more on non-bank lending, are operating in greater 
distance from their affiliates in the UK and banking groups which operate higher number of these affiliated 
institutions. Our strategy is to re-run Equation 1 on subsamples of our data. We split our sample into high and low 
share of non-bank loans, where banking groups with a share of non-bank lending above the median share for all 
banks fall into former category.22 Banks belonging to banking groups operating more than 3 foreign affiliates in the 
UK (above 75th percentile) are classified as banking groups with high number of affiliates. Finally, banking groups 
where the distance between the parent bank headquarter and foreign affiliates location is above 75th percentile of 
distance for all banking groups are defined as high distance banking groups. To confirm whether the differences in 
the magnitude of coefficient for split samples significantly differ from each other, we construct three dummy 
variables for each sample split and interact it with our main interaction term (Regulation*Type). We include this 
triple interaction in equation 1. Non-bank loans share is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for banks from 
banking groups classified as groups with high share of non-bank lending, and zero otherwise. Number of affiliates 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks which belong to banking groups operating high numbers of foreign 
affiliates, and zero otherwise. Finally, Distance is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks where the distance 
between the parent bank headquarter and foreign affiliate is high, and zero otherwise.  
                                                          
22 We split our sample at the median of non-bank lending share because splitting the sample at 75th percentile results in a sample where none 
of the banks are subject to tightening in macroprudential regulation. 
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Table 6 presents the results. For each test, we only present results where our dependent variable is the growth rate 
of interbank loans.23 In Panel A we split banking groups according to the share of non-bank lending to total lending 
of all their affiliated institutions present in the UK. We find that differential effects of capital requirement 
tightening are stronger for banking groups with a high ratio of non-bank lending (High). In line with predictions in 
Williamson (1976) and Aghion and Tirole (1997), the autonomy of subsidiaries in these banking groups should be 
greater and therefore it will be more difficult for the parent bank to adjust their lending in response to tighter 
macroprudential regulation.   
In Panel B, we split our sample according to the number of affiliates which banking groups operate in the UK. 
Banking groups operating more than three affiliates (above 75th percentile) again exhibit stronger differential effect 
relative to groups with lower numbers of affiliates. Again, these results suggest that the driving mechanism behind 
the results in Table 5 is the degree of control which parent banks hold over their branches compared to subsidiaries.  
Finally, in Panel C of Table 6, we split the sample according to the geographical distance dividing banking groups 
headquarters and headquarters of their UK affiliates. Here we also find support for our proposed transmission 
mechanism. The coefficient on the interaction term in Equation1 is higher for the subsample of banking groups 
located further away from their UK subsidiaries and branches. In line with Williamson (1976), Dessein (2002) and 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2009), more distant subsidiaries should benefit from more decision making autonomy. In 
such case, it is again more difficult for parent banks to influence the asset side of their subsidiaries’ balance sheets.  
Triple interaction terms in Panels A, B and C of Table 6 confirm that the differences in magnitude of coefficients 
for each sample split are statistically significant. Overall, these results support our proposed transmission 
mechanism hypothesis, stating that the effect of tightening macroprudential regulation will be stronger for branches 
than subsidiaries due to higher degree of control which parent banks hold over the former type of institutions. 
To provide more direct evidence for the existence of the proposed transmission mechanism, we perform one more 
test. We obtain information on the number of independent directors who sit on the boards of bank subsidiaries in 
our sample.24 The Prudential Regulatory Authority in the UK and the Bank for International Settlements, advise 
banks to include a sufficient number of independent directors who should provide an impartial evaluation of any 
group level decisions affecting operations of a subsidiary and challenge decisions of executive directors (PRA, 
2016; BIS, 2010). The intuition behind this test is that in institutions where there is a higher share of independent 
directors on the board, decision making process, regarding bank operations, will be more autonomous.25 Therefore, 
we expect to observe a stronger differential effect in those groups in which board independence is higher, as the 
parent bank will have to reduce branch lending more in response to a tightening of capital requirements.  
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 Results for regressions with non-bank lending growth as a dependent variable are insignificant in each case and therefore we refrain from 
reporting them. These results are available upon request. 
24
 Information on board composition is obtained from the BoardEx database. We were unable to obtain this information for all banks in our 
sample and therefore the number of observations in this test is lower than in all other tests. 
 
27 
Table 6 
Transmission mechanism tests 
Panel A: Sample split on the group share of non-bank lending 
Dependent variable: Interbank lending 
Split variable: Share of non-bank lending -  High Low  
    
Capital regulation*Type*Non-bank loans share -0.025** 
(-2.29) 
Capital regulation*Type -0.036*** -0.060** -0.036*** 
(-13.54) (-2.34) (-13.67) 
Observations 4,107 1,956 2,151 
R-squared 0.562 0.592 0.521 
Controls YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country 
Panel B: Sample split on the number of affiliates 
Dependent variable: Interbank lending 
Split variable: Number of affiliates -  High Low  
    
Capital regulation*Type*Number of affiliates -0.040*** 
(-4.89) 
Capital regulation*Type -0.041*** -0.082*** -0.039*** 
(-4.65) (-10.84) (-8.99) 
Observations 4,107 1,524 2,583 
R-squared 0.565 0.422 0.670 
Controls YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country 
Panel C: Sample split on distance between parent bank headquarter and foreign affiliate 
Dependent variable: Interbank lending 
Split variable: Distance to parent banks headquarter - High  Low 
    
Capital regulation*Type*Distance -0.038** 
(-2.33) 
Capital regulation*Type -0.045** -0.083*** -0.045** 
(-2.77) (-15.36) (-2.79) 
Observations 4,107 1,162 2,945 
R-squared 0.562 0.601 0.543 
Controls YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country 
Panel D: Sample split on board independence index 
Dependent variable: Board independence 
Split variable: Board independence  - High  Low 
    
Capital regulation*Type*Board independence -0.059*** 
(-4.54) 
Capital regulation*Type -0.025** -0.087*** -0.032*** 
(-2.24) (-4.83) (-4.14) 
Observations 3,391 1,208 2,183 
R-squared 0.555 0.547 0.564 
Controls YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 6 presents results of regressions testing transmission mechanism behind the main results in Table 4. In each column Model 1 is estimated using subsamples. Reported 
are only results for regressions with Interbank loans included as the dependent variable. In Panel A the sample is split into banking groups with non-bank lending share of total loans 
above (High) and below (Low) the median of the share of all banking groups. In Panel B the sample is split into banking groups operating more than three institutions (above 75th 
percentile) in the UK (High) and less than four institutions (Low). In Panel C banking groups are divided according to the distance between headquarter of the banking group and 
headquarter of the affiliate banks operating in the UK. Banking groups located above 75th percentile of distance are included in the High distance group and banking groups located 
below the 75th percentile of the distance are included in the Low distance group. Finally, in Panel D banking groups are split based on the share of board members who are 
independent. Banking groups where the share of independent directors is above the median of this share for all banks are classified as highly independent banks (High) and banking 
groups where the share of independent directors is below the median are classified as less independent banks (Low)  We also report results of regressions which include interaction 
terms between Regulation, Type and dummy variables equal to 1 if banks belong to banking groups: with high non-bank loans share (Panel A), operating high number of foreign 
affiliates (Panel B), banking groups with high distance dividing headquarters of the parent banks and its affiliated institutions operating in the UK; and banking groups with a higher 
share of independent directors on the board of directors (Panel D). All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country 
level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We classify banks with the share of independent directors above the median share of independent directors in all 
financial institutions in our sample as banks with a highly independent board (High), the remaining banks are 
classified as those with a less independent board (Low). 
Panel D of Table 6 shows the results. Again, we start by creating a triple interaction with the dummy denoting high 
or low board independence (the Board independence dummy variable is equal to 1 for highly independent boards, 
and 0 otherwise) and our main interaction term (Regulation*Type), and then we split the sample into two groups. 
We find that the differential response of banks’ lending to tighter capital requirements is less pronounced in groups 
where the parent bank holds more control over its subsidiaries (board independence is lower) and stronger where 
the share of independent directors is higher and therefore the board is more autonomous.        
4.3 Robustness tests 
We run a number of robustness tests. Firstly, we examine if our results are driven or biased by events coinciding 
with changes in macroprudential regulation. Such events could bias the results to the extent to which they affect 
UK branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks differently. One type of event is a change in microprudential, bank-
specific, capital requirements, of the sort examined in Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014) 
Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014). Banks subject to these requirements, include UK-owned banks and 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, but not branches of foreign banks. If a tightening of capital requirements in a given 
home country of a foreign bank overlaps with a tightening of capital requirements of its UK subsidiaries, then it is 
possible that the both branches and subsidiaries will reduce their lending. Such a situation is likely to render a 
downward bias on our treatment effect, since the differences in branches’ and subsidiaries’ lending growth around 
the change in macroprudential regulation will increase.  
To test if our main results can be biased by such events, we exclude from our sample all subsidiaries which were 
subject to changes in bank-specific capital requirements. Table 7 presents the coefficients, which are slightly 
greater in magnitude compared to those in Table 5, indicating a downward bias. Importantly however, the 
differential effect of capital requirements on interbank lending is still statistically significant. 
Table 7 
Threats to identification: Subsidiaries subject to bank specific capital requirements removed 
  Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
     
Capital regulation*Type -0.029 -0.025 -0.066** -0.075** 
(-0.41) (-0.38) (-2.38) (-2.42) 
Bank size (ln) -0.004 0.032 
(-0.14) (1.35) 
Interbank share -0.258*** 0.208 
(-5.85) (1.70) 
Observations 3,882 3,882 3,882 3,882 
R-squared 0.580 0.564 0.571 0.564 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 7 presents results of difference-in-difference regressions, examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign banks in the UK. We 
replicate the results presented in Table 5 with the sample excluding subsidiaries which are subject to changes in bank-specific capital requirements imposed by the Financial Services 
Authority. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Next, we perform three falsification tests to check whether differences between the growth of lending provided by 
branches and subsidiaries in Table 5 can be attributed to changes in macroprudential regulation or are driven by 
other factors, or chance. We run two Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 replications, where first we randomly 
assign placebo treatment to branches affected by changes in regulation in their home markets but we pretend that 
these changes occurred in periods preceding their actual occurrence. In the second falsification test, we pretend that 
the change in macroprudential regulation affected branches from countries which never altered their 
macroprudential regulation. We estimate the following regression: 
∆yijkt = αi + β(Placeboijk) + φBCit + γi + γjkt + εijkt. (3) 
where Placebo is a binary variable randomly set to 1 for banks in the treatment group (affected foreign banks’ 
branches) in periods preceding actual change to macroprudential regulation, and later equal to 1 for banks in 
countries where no changes to macroprudential regulation occurred during our sample period. We repeat this 
process 1,000 times, saving the p-value on the coefficient β from each regression and compute the rejection rates of 
the null hypothesis β=0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Because we know that placebo treatments should have had 
no effect in both tests, we know that the null of zero effect is true. We should therefore only reject the null by 
making Type I errors. The results of this exercise are shown in Panel A and Panel B of Table 8. The rejection rates 
for all dependent variables are in line with those that would occur through Type I errors. This analysis further 
strengthens our main results. 
Table 8 
Falsification tests 
Panel A: Falsification test 1 Panel B: Falsification test 2 Panel C: Falsification test 3 
Number of replications: 1000 Number of replications: 1000    Variable 
 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-bank  
Loans 
  
   
Interbank 
Lending 
Non-bank  
Loans 
Interbank  
Lending 
Non-bank  
loans 
  Placebo Capital requirements 0.0301 (0.35) 
-0.0192 
(0.56) 
  Placebo
 Lending standards 0.0395 -0.0111 
Rejection rates at 1% level 
(2-tailed test): 
Rejection rates at 1% level  
(2-tailed test):   Placebo
 Reserve requirements 
(1.15) 
-0.047 
(0.96) 
0.0252 
1.00% 1.20% 1.10% 1.00% (-0.24) (0.02) 
Rejection rates at 5% level  
(2-tailed test): 
Rejection rates at 5% level  
(2-tailed test): 
   Controls 
   Bank FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
4.70% 5.20% 4.40% 4.80%    Year FE YES YES 
   Rejection rates at 10% level  
(2-tailed test): 
Rejection rates at 10% level  
(2-tailed test):    Observations 4,852 4,852 
8.40%   9.50% 8.70%   9.20%    Cluster 0.077 0.132 
Notes. Table 8 presents Monte Carlo simulations in Panel A and Panel B. We estimate the regression ∆yijkt = αi + β(Placeboijk) + φBCit + γi + γjkt + εijkt , where in Panel A, Placebo is 
a binary variable randomly set to 1 for banks in the treatment group (affected foreign banks’ branches) in periods preceding actual change in macroprudential regulation. In Panel B, 
we randomly assign banks to placebo treatment status setting Placebo equal to 1 for banks in countries where no changes to macroprudential regulation occurred during our sample 
period. We estimate the regression and save the p-value on the coefficient β and repeat this process 1,000 times and compute the rejection rates of the null hypothesis β=0 at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. Panel C presents results of tests where we examine the effect of macroprudential regulation on UK-owned banks. Here, only UK-owned banks are included in 
the sample. We estimate the following regression ∆yit = αi + β(Placeboit) + φBCit + γi + γt + εit , where our dependent variable denotes a growth rate in lending provided to non-bank 
borrowers (Non-bank lending) and other banks (Interbank lending). Placebo takes a value of one for periods in which variable Regulationkt in specification 1 is equal to 1, and 0 
otherwise. We generate a Placebo variable for each type of macroprudential regulation. Regressions include variables controlling for the size of the institution and share of interbank 
loans on its balance sheet, and bank and quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In our third falsification test, we want to observe if UK banks alter their lending during quarters in which changes 
to macroprudential regulation are taking place in other countries. Results of these tests are important for two 
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reasons. Firstly, finding significant effects would suggest that UK-owned banks’ lending is also affected by 
changes to macroprudential regulation via reduced availability of interbank funds, which we document in Table 5. 
Secondly, given that banks can substitute interbank funds from affected institutions with funds from non-affected 
banks or with other type of funding significant results may also suggest that some other UK-specific factors may be 
coinciding with changes in macroprudential regulation in foreign markets. To this end, we construct a sample 
consisting of only UK-owned banks operating during our sample period and estimate the following model: 
∆yit = αi + β(Placeboit) + φBCit + γi + γt + εit,  (4) 
where Placebo takes a value of 1 for periods in which variable Regulation in specification 1 is equal to 1, and 0 
otherwise. We generate a placebo treatment variable for each type of macroprudential regulation. The results of this 
test are shown in Panel C of Table 8. The coefficient on all of our placebo treatment variables remains 
indistinguishable from zero, providing support for our baseline results. 
Table 9 
Placebo regressions  
Panel A: Capital requirements 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
Capital requirements*Type
 (t-1) 0.203 0.171 0.064 0.133 
(1.26) (1.08) (0.81) (1.63) 
Capital requirements*Type
 (t-2) -0.084 -0.007 0.152 0.149 
(-0.83) (-0.05) (1.05) (1.00) 
Capital requirements*Type
 (t-3) 0.063 0.032 -0.072 -0.033 
(0.98) (0.45) (-0.81) (-0.26) 
Observations 3,822 4,013 3,917 3,822 3,822 4,013 3,917 3,822 
R-squared 0.574 0.570 0.572 0.573 0.576 0.573 0.572 0.575 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel B: Lending standards 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
Lending standards*Type
 (t-1) 0.071* 0.050 0.034 0.021 
(2.04) (0.92) (0.99) (0.43) 
Lending standards*Type
 (t-2) 0.056 0.014 0.122 0.060 
(1.13) (0.14) (1.26) (0.56) 
Lending standards*Type
 (t-3) 0.045 0.063* -0.191* -0.176* 
(1.17) (2.01) (-2.07) (-1.90) 
Observations 3,822 4,013 3,917 3,822 3,822 4,013 3,917 3,822 
R-squared 0.574 0.569 0.572 0.574 0.577 0.572 0.572 0.576 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel C: Reserve requirements 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
Reserve requirements*Type
 (t-1) -0.032 -0.030 0.046 0.050 
(-0.29) (-0.30) (0.32) (0.40) 
Reserve requirements*Type
 (t-2) 0.025 0.028 -0.083 -0.069 
(0.29) (0.36) (-0.52) (-0.43) 
Reserve requirements*Type
 (t-3) 0.039 0.041 -0.034 -0.042 
(0.52) (0.57) (-0.16) (-0.19) 
Observations 3,822 4,013 3,917 3,822 3,822 4,013 3,917 3,822 
R-squared 0.573 0.569 0.572 0.573 0.575 0.572 0.572 0.575 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 9 illustrates the results of placebo regressions. We replicate the results from Table 5, replacing the treatment variable in specification 1 with its forwarded values by 1, 2 
and 3 quarters. Non-bank lending refers to foreign banks’ lending to the UK private non-bank sector and interbank lending to foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All 
variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Our next robustness test reconsiders the parallel trends assumption. We replicate our main results but forward our 
treatment variable by one, two and three quarters. This test allows us to establish whether the treatment effect we 
observe in Table 5 is a result of some general trends in lending behaviour of branches and subsidiaries or truly due 
to changes in macroprudential regulation. The intuition is that if the latter is true, we should not observe significant 
differences in lending of branches and subsidiaries prior to the real occurrence of the regulatory change. We report 
the results of these tests in Table 9. In all cases, the forwarded treatment variable shows no statistical significance, 
which further strengthens the argument that the disparities between the lending provided by foreign banks’ 
branches and subsidiaries are due to changes in the intensity of macroprudential regulation in their home country. 
In Table 10 we aim to examine if the effects presented in Table 5 hold if we exclude banks from any country that 
tightens capital requirements. This exercise addresses concerns that the results presented in Table 5 could be driven 
by changes in any particular country or a high frequency of changes in capital requirements in India reported in 
Panel D of Table 1. Our results do not suggest that this is the case. Excluding banks from any given country which 
tightened capital requirements still yields a statistically significant negative differential effect. 
Table 10 
Excluding individual countries 
Excluded country: Ireland South Africa Italy China 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Capital 
regulation*Type -0.040 -0.067*** -0.023 -0.055*** -0.023 -0.055*** -0.023 -0.055*** 
(-0.43) (-4.08) (-0.40) (-3.21) (-0.40) (-3.21) (-0.39) (-3.19) 
Lending 
standards*Type -0.003 0.033 -0.004 0.027 -0.004 0.027 0.013 0.018 
(-0.02) (0.59) (-0.03) (0.55) (-0.03) (0.55) (0.11) (0.41) 
Reserve 
requirements*Type 0.020 0.031 0.017 0.066 0.017 0.066 0.063 0.068 
(0.18) (0.29) (0.17) (0.62) (0.17) (0.62) (0.66) (0.53) 
Observations 3,879 3,879 4,069 4,069 4,061 4,061 4,025 4,025 
R-squared 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.562 0.561 0.563 0.560 0.560 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Excluded country: Switzerland Australia India Philippines 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Non-Bank 
lending 
Interbank 
lending 
Capital 
regulation*Type -0.051 -0.056** 0.021 -0.043*** -0.023 -0.055*** -0.023 -0.055*** 
(-0.80) (-2.46) (0.74) (-4.75) (-0.41) (-3.18) (-0.41) (-3.22) 
Lending 
standards*Type -0.004 0.027 -0.004 0.027 -0.004 0.027 -0.004 0.027 
(-0.03) (0.53) (-0.03) (0.55) (-0.03) (0.55) (-0.03) (0.55) 
Reserve 
requirements*Type 0.039 0.094 0.017 0.066 0.014 0.076 0.017 0.066 
(0.36) (0.84) (0.17) (0.61) (0.14) (0.69) (0.17) (0.62) 
Observations 3,846 3,846 3,770 3,770 4,028 4,028 4,042 4,042 
R-squared 0.574 0.570 0.554 0.566 0.561 0.561 0.559 0.556 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. In Table 10 we replicate the results from Table 5 excluding one country affected by the macroprudential regulation tightening at a time. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 
95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In Table 11, we provide a number of additional sensitivity tests. We replicate the regressions in Table 5 using an 
alternative control group which includes only subsidiaries of banking groups affected by changes in 
macroprudential regulation and excludes branches and subsidiaries of banks which are not subject to tighter capital 
requirements, lending standards or reserve requirements. The results of these tests are reported in Panel A of Table 
11 and they remain identical to our baseline results. 
Table 11 
Additional robustness tests 
Panel A: Alternative control group 
 Non-bank lending Interbank lending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Capital regulation*Type -0.023 -0.022 -0.057** -0.059** 
(-0.38) (-0.37) (-2.22) (-2.44) 
Lending standards*Type 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.026 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.61) 
Reserve requirements*Type -0.012 -0.012 0.090 0.091 
(-0.12) (-0.11) (0.95) (0.96) 
Bank size (ln) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 
(-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.50) (1.13) (1.13) (1.13) (1.13) 
Interbank share -0.223*** -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.223*** 0.212 0.208 0.208 0.212 
(-6.05) (-6.18) (-6.10) (-6.09) (1.65) (1.63) (1.64) (1.65) 
Observations 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,576 
R-squared 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel B: Control variables excluded 
Non-bank lending Interbank lending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Capital regulation*Type -0.024 -0.024 -0.057** -0.059*** 
(-0.42) (-0.42) (-2.84) (-3.13) 
Lending standards*Type -0.003 -0.003 0.030 0.031 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (0.62) (0.63) 
Reserve requirements*Type 0.015 0.015 0.059 0.060 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.58) (0.59) 
Observations 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.557 0.557 0.557 0.557 0.562 0.561 0.562 0.562 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel C: Standard errors clustered at the bank level 
Non-bank lending Interbank lending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Capital regulation*Type -0.059 -0.065 
  
-0.057*** -0.059*** 
  (-0.52) (-0.66) 
  
(-2.27) (-4.13) 
  Lending standards*Type 0.034 
 
0.037 
 
0.020 
 
0.024 
 (0.51) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.60) 
 Reserve requirements*Type 0.025 
  
0.026 0.084 
  
0.085 
(0.26) 
  
(0.28) (1.21) 
  
(1.08) 
Bank size (ln) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (1.23) (1.58) (1.59) (1.57) 
Interbank share -0.101** -0.101** -0.101** -0.101** 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 
(-2.40) (-2.24) (-2.19) (-2.25) (0.81) (1.02) (1.01) (1.03) 
Observations 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.515 0.514 0.514 0.514 
Bank Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Notes. Table 11 presents additional robustness tests of the results presented in Table 5. In Panel A regressions are estimated using an alternative control group, which includes only 
subsidiaries of banks affected by a tightening of macroprudential regulation. Regressions presented in Panel B replicate results in Table 5 excluding control variables. In Panel C 
regressions in Table 5 are replicated with standard errors clustered at the bank level. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In Panel B, we revisit the validity of the assumption that the changes in macroprudential regulation are exogenous. 
Whited and Roberts (2012) argue that if the treatment effect is randomly assigned, then the magnitude of this effect 
should not depend on the inclusion of control variables in the model. Otherwise, random assignment for the 
treatment variable should be called into question. Additionally, it can be argued that the size of foreign affiliates 
might affect home-country regulators’ decisions regarding the tightening of macroprudential policy. Similar 
arguments could be made with respect to the level of interbank/non-bank lending provision. Excluding these 
control variables allows us to test whether any potential endogenous relationship between these variables could bias 
estimates on our main explanatory variables. 
We omit bank-specific time-varying control variables from the baseline specification and find that the magnitudes 
of the coefficients for the main explanatory variable are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5. Most 
importantly, the magnitude for the effect of capital requirement changes on interbank lending is almost exactly the 
same for both models. These results suggest that the treatment effect is exogenous with respect to characteristics of 
individual branches and subsidiaries, and our main results are not affected by inclusion of potentially endogenous 
control variables. 
Panel C of Table 11 presents results of a robustness test, which examines the sensitivity of our estimates to 
alternative clustering of the standard errors. Our main results are estimated using a specification in which we 
cluster heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors at the country level. In Panel C, we present the results for tests 
where errors are clustered at the banking level. Our findings remain very similar. Standard errors are slightly higher 
compared to those in our baseline model; however, the effect of capital requirements on foreign banks’ interbank 
lending is still significant at 5% level.26 
4.4 Long-run effects 
Our baseline results explore heterogeneity in the effect of regulatory changes on contemporaneous lending 
provided by foreign banks in the UK. But it is also important to investigate the duration of these effects. To 
consider this, we modify regression specification 1 in Table 5 by replacing the interaction term with its first, second 
and third lag. Significant coefficients of the lags of the interactions will inform us about the duration of the effects 
found in Table 5. 
Table 12 presents the results of this analysis. In all of the regressions, the lagged interactions between the Type and 
Regulation variables are statistically insignificant. This suggests that the differences in the effect of changes in 
macroprudential regulation on lending provided by foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries are only 
contemporaneous and disappear after the quarter in which changes occurred. These results are not surprising; in the 
case of capital requirements, a tightening requires an immediate response from the banking group. Since the higher 
degree of control over the branch allows the parent bank to immediately adjust its affiliate branch lending, we 
                                                          
26
 Additionally, we perform tests with standard errors clustered at the banking group level. The results are similar to those in Table 5 and are 
available upon request. 
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would expect that the adjustment would be most significant around the announcement of the new capital adequacy 
regime. In the later quarters, we would not observe the significant differences in lending growth between branches 
and subsidiaries due to a lack of further adjustments or due to the fact that lending adjustments in case of subsidiary 
require more time. Once they are in place, the difference between lending growth provided by both types of 
institutions diminishes.  
Table 12 
Duration analysis 
Panel A: Capital requirements 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
                  
Capital requirements*Type
 (t+1) 0.159 0.131 -0.030 -0.048 
(1.13) (1.17) (-0.22) (-0.37) 
Capital requirements*Type
 (t+2) -0.113 -0.059 -0.102 -0.099 
(-1.17) (-1.56) (-0.50) (-0.60) 
Capital requirements*Type
 (t+3) 0.109 0.080 0.036 0.017 
(1.20) (0.73) (0.22) (0.12) 
Observations 3,911 4,100 4,006 3,911 3,911 4,100 4,006 3,911 
R-squared 0.574 0.563 0.571 0.573 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.570 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel B: Lending standards 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
Lending standards*Type
 (t+1) -0.069 -0.049 0.098 0.095* 
(-1.06) (-0.74) (1.66) (1.85) 
Lending standards*Type
 (t+2) 0.026 0.031 -0.075 -0.065 
(0.52) (0.67) (-0.53) (-0.47) 
Lending standards*Type
 (t+3) 0.013 0.003 0.016 0.028 
(0.34) (0.08) (0.21) (0.44) 
Observations 3,911 4,100 4,006 3,911 3,911 4,100 4,006 3,911 
R-squared 0.567 0.557 0.563 0.567 0.562 0.562 0.563 0.561 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel C: Reserve requirements 
Non-Bank lending Interbank lending 
Reserve requirements*Type
 (t+1) 0.092 0.082 -0.135 -0.128 
(1.02) (0.96) (-1.16) (-1.28) 
Reserve requirements*Type
 (t+2) 0.021 0.019 -0.034 -0.037 
(0.19) (0.15) (-0.24) (-0.28) 
Reserve requirements*Type
 (t+3) -0.038 -0.034 0.130 0.123 
(-0.49) (-0.35) (1.15) (1.18) 
Observations 3,911 4,100 4,006 3,911 3,911 4,100 4,006 3,911 
R-squared 0.567 0.557 0.563 0.567 0.562 0.562 0.563 0.562 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table 12 presents results examining the duration of the effects found in Table 5. We replicate regressions in Table 5, replacing treatment dummies with its three lags. All 
variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Previous studies document that multinational banks transmit negative shocks to their balance sheets – including 
those triggered by changes in regulation – across national borders. In this paper, we examine if the magnitude of 
the spillover effects depends on the organizational structure of banks’ foreign affiliates. We exploit cross-country 
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cross-time variation in the implementation of macroprudential regulation to test if lending in the UK by foreign 
banks’ branches and subsidiaries responds differently to a tightening of capital requirements, lending standards or 
reserve requirements in these foreign banks’ home countries. 
Our results show that multinational banks’ branches respond to tighter capital requirements in their home countries 
by contracting their lending more than subsidiaries. On average, branch interbank lending growth in the UK grows 
by 5.7 percentage points slower, relative to subsidiaries following a tightening of capital requirements in the bank’s 
home country. This is in line with our hypothesis which predicts that branch lending will be affected due to the 
higher degree of control which parent banks have over their foreign branches. But this heterogeneity in response to 
capital requirements is only observed in the case of lending to other banks. We find that the response of lending to 
non-bank borrowers to a tightening in capital requirements does not depend on the organizational form of foreign 
banks’ UK affiliates. Turning to the impact of a tightening in lending standards or reserve requirements, we find 
that there are no differential effects on interbank and non-bank lending.  
Our additional analysis reveals that our baseline results are stronger for banking groups which rely more on the 
collection of soft information for credit decisions, operate more affiliated institutions in the UK, and in which 
foreign affiliates operate in further geographical distance from their parent banks’ headquarter. Parent banks in 
these banking groups are more likely to delegate more autonomy to boards of their foreign subsidiaries, in which 
case it is relatively easier to adjust lending of affiliates operating under the branch structure in response to a 
tightening of capital requirements. We also show that the magnitude of the baseline results is higher for banking 
groups where the share of the independent board members is higher. This supports our hypothesis that the 
differential effects are driven by the degree of control which parent banks hold over their foreign institutions 
operating under different organizational forms.  
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Appendix A 
The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is a unique source of 
comparable world-wide data on how banks are regulated and supervised around the world. The 
current survey provides information on bank regulation and supervision for 143 jurisdictions. It 
covers data since 2008, and therefore allows examination of the recent state of bank regulation and 
supervision in a wide range of countries and comparison with the pre-crisis situation. It is available 
here: 
 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345
037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  
The current fourth round of the survey started in 2011 and was completed in 2012. For our analysis 
the most important part of this survey is question 3.6, explaining calculation of minimum capital 
requirements for banking groups. In Table A we present responses of national regulators which 
tighten capital requirements and are included in our sample. 
 
 
3.6 The regulatory minimum capital requirements are applied  
 
 
a) on a “solo” basis at the individual bank level  
 
 
 
 
 
b) on a consolidated basis at every banking group 
or subgroup level 
 
 
 
c) on a consolidated basis for the non-bank 
holding company (if it exists) that is the parent 
entity of a bank 
 
 
 
d) on a “solo” basis at the holding company level  
The requirements are applied only on the 
exposures of the individual bank, not taking into 
account any exposures incurred through its 
subsidiaries, or, on a pro rata basis, in companies 
in which the bank holds a minority interest.  
 
The requirements are applied to subgroups within 
the conglomerate, taking into account exposures 
held in subsidiaries, or, on a pro rata basis, in 
minority interests.  
 
The requirements are applied to the whole of the 
group, including the parent holding company of 
the bank, even when the holding company is not 
itself holder of a banking license.  
 
 
When it holds a banking license of its own, the 
holding company itself is subject to capital 
adequacy requirements, without taking into 
account exposures of other group companies 
(including banks).  
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Table A 
Minimum capital requirements calculation: World Bank survey  
 
AUSTRALIA CHINA INDIA IRELAND ITALY PHILIPPINES SOUTH AFRICA SPAIN SWITZERLAND 
3.6 The regulatory minimum capital 
requirements are applied …. 
         
a. On a solo basis at the individual 
bank level --- X --- --- --- --- --- --- X 
b. On a consolidated basis at every 
banking group or subgroup level X --- X X X X --- X --- 
c. On a consolidated basis for the 
nonbank holding company (if it 
exists) that is the parent entity of a 
bank 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
d. On a solo basis at the holding 
company level --- --- --- --- --- --- X --- --- 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1  
Macroprudential regulation, banks’ cross-border lending and bank size 
Non-bank lending Interbank lending 
 (1) (2) 
Capital regulation*Type*Bank size 0.001 0.006** 
(0.78) (2.42) 
Lending standards*Type*Bank size -0.013 -0.024 
(-1.10) (1.03) 
Reserve requirements*Type*Bank size 0.009 -0.001 
(1.71) (-0.24) 
Capital requirements*Type -0.096 -0.072** 
(-1.73) (-2.09) 
Lending standards*Type 0.028 0.077 
(0.27) (0.82) 
Reserve requirements*Type -0.074 0.097 
(-0.78) (0.87) 
Bank size (ln) -0.001 0.032 
(-0.05) (1.93) 
Interbank share -0.247 0.215 
(-6.44) (1.93) 
Observations 4,107 4,107 
R-squared 0.573 0.569 
Group*Quarter FE YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES 
Cluster Country Country 
Notes. Table B.1 reports results of regressions which include interaction terms between Regulation, Type and Total 
assets of individual institutions, which is a proxy for their size. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile 
Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Table B.2 
Macroprudential regulation and banks’ cross-border lending: Branch vs. Subsidiary effect 
 
Non-bank lending Interbank lending 
 
Branch Subsidiary Branch Subsidiary 
Capital regulation 0.044 0.014 -0.112*** -0.026 
 
(1.33) (0.80) (-4.26) (-0.17) 
Lending standards 0.082* 0.034* 0.019 0.003 
 
(1.90) (1.92) (0.58) (0.19) 
Reserve requirements 0.002 0.036 -0.026 0.059 
 
(0.04) (0.75) (-0.54) (1.17) 
Bank size (ln) 0.003 -0.011 0.037*** 0.019 
 
(0.42) (-0.95) (4.03) (1.24) 
Interbank share -0.203*** -0.329*** 0.220*** 0.272*** 
 
(-5.23) (-4.96) (6.09) (4.01) 
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.21) (-0.44) 
Household debt (ln) -0.090 -0.123 -0.307 -0.218 
 
(-0.67) (-0.71) (-1.60) (-1.06) 
Domestic lending (ln) 0.057 -0.058 0.484*** 0.169 
 
(0.63) (-0.37) (5.01) (1.22) 
Observations 1,892 2,028 1,892 2,028 
R-squared 0.099 0.096 0.079 0.11 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Country Country Country Country 
Notes. Table B.2 presents results of regressions examining the effect of macroprudential regulatory changes on lending of foreign banks in the UK. We estimate 
the following model: ∆yijkt = αi+β(Regulationkt)+φBCit+δCCkt+γi+γt+εijkt separately for branches and subsidiaries of multinational banks. Our dependent 
variables include foreign banks’ lending to the UK non-bank sector and foreign banks’ interbank lending in the UK. All dependent variables are in percentage 
point growth rates. The main explanatory variable Regulation, a dummy for regulatory change, equal to 1 if regulation is tightened in country i at quarter t, and 0 
for all other periods. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of macroprudential regulation tightening on foreign banks’ lending in the UK, 
irrespective of their organizational form. The set of bank-time varying control variables (BC) include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size (ln)), and 
the share of interbank lending (Interbank share). Country-time varying control variables (CC) control for countrys’ GDP growth, level of household debt, and 
total domestic lending provided by domestic banks. Additionally, regressions include bank and quarter fixed effects. All variables are winsorized at 5th and 95th 
percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the banks’ home country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
